Introduction
Probabilistic pragmatics follows the recent trend in cognitive science to understand cognition as Bayesian inference and rational decision making under uncertainty (Chater, Tenenbaum, and Yuille 2006; Tenenbaum et al. 2011) . As the insights, tools, and ideas that drive this trend may also be useful for linguists, Franke and Jäger (this volume) , henceforce F&J, draw attention to these developments and give a timely introduction to probabilistic pragmatics by showcasing some substantive examples (see also Goodman and Lassiter 2015) .
In cognitive science there is an ongoing (and sometimes fierce) debate about the merits and problems of Bayesian modeling Davis 2012a, 2012b; Chater et al. 2011; Griffiths et al. 2012; Jones and Love 2011; Davis 2013, 2015) . F&J address in detail what is probably the most controversial aspect of Bayesian models, namely that they are "rational" (or optimal). As many of the arguments that have been exchanged about Bayesian modeling in cognitive science apply equally to linguistics, we will not repeat these arguments here. Still, briefly, while it may appear that Bayesian modeling makes very strong and implausible assumptions about human rationality, in practice many modelers are fairly pragmatic and see probability theory merely as a useful and well-developed tool to address questions of reasoning under uncertainty (see F&J, p. 8) . In this way, a rational analysis is often just a convenient starting point for reverse-engineering the underlying mechanisms of a cognitive phenomenon (Zednik and Jäkel 2014) . Hence, even if the assumptions of a rational analysis are deemed suspicious, a Bayesian model may still inspire fruitful experimental and theoretical work -and this, for us, is the relevant criterion for success.
Frank Jäkel and Mingya Liu
With these general remarks about Bayesian modeling in cognitive science out of the way, we can focus on the specific point that F&J want to argue for: Probabilistic models are particularly promising for pragmatics. Apart from the trivial benefits of being "computational" and "data-oriented", as probabilistic models are also "probabilistic" (duh, indeed) they can deal with uncertainty. F&J demonstrate convincingly that language production and comprehension are full of uncertainty and taking this uncertainty into account provides additional explanatory power (take their reference game example or their example of the meaning of "some"). They also show convincingly that using probabilistic models they can deal with gradedness in pragmatic data (see e.g., their Figure 4 ). As the usual tools in formal linguistics (i.e. logics) cannot, this is no small feat, but applies equally, for example, to the psychology of reasoning (Oaksford and Chater 2001) . Hence, we think the most important contribution of the target article is to argue that models for pragmatic phenomena should not only be "probabilistic" but also "interactive". That is, models should explicitly deal with problems of (at least) two interacting language users in uncertain contexts. Probabilistic pragmatics is the only game in town that promises to deliver on both accounts. We therefore share F&J's excitement and agree that probabilistic pragmatics is a research program with great potential.
While the examples that F&J provide illustrate the benefits of using probabilities, their choice of examples is not ideal for illustrating the innovative combination of "probability" and "interactivity" in probabilistic pragmatics. First, although F&J highlight interactivity as one of the defining features of probabilistic pragmatics in comparison to traditional approaches, they do not discuss the relevant phenomena from a truly interactive perspective until Section 6. For example, their discussion of scalar implicatures (pp. 21-25) makes a strong point for "probabilistic" models but focuses only on the hearer's interpretation of speaker meaning and is hence not truly "interactive": While the hearer takes into account what the speaker is likely to say, what the speaker is likely to say does not depend on what the speaker thinks the hearer is likely to understand in the given context. F&J will probably agree that from a theoretical point of view this mutually recursive aspect of language production and comprehension is central to interactivity and calls for an application of game theory, but their discussion of implicatures does not reflect that.
The case study of indirect speech acts in Section 6 (F&J, 30-35) is much more convincing in this regard as it involves uncertainty and strategic reasoning about reasoning. However, while indirect speech acts are interesting phenomena per se, the detailed examples that F&J give in Section 6 do not connect very well with standard problems in formal pragmatics. Instead, to us they seem to be examples of economic reasoning in a social context with little in-volvement of language. Their long carpet example could be straight out of a textbook on business negotiation strategies. This is unfortunate because we believe that probabilistic pragmatics will be made more interesting to linguists if one can demonstrate its merits, in particular the possibility to handle interactivity together with uncertainty, with phenomena typical for linguistic pragmatics. Thus, our goal in this comment is to supplement their Section 6 with an additional extended example on scalar implicatures in order to lend further support to their position. As scalar implicatures are a key topic in formal and experimental semantics and pragmatics, they are also very popular among probabilistic modelers (Degen 2015; Goodman and Stuhlmüller 2013) . Compared to F&J, we emphasize much more strongly the reasoning about reasoning aspect of language production and comprehension. In this way, the connections to game theory and more general questions about social cognition become apparent in a standard linguistic example. Based on our extended example we finish by discussing some promising avenues and potential pitfalls beyond the ones discussed by F&J.
Some, but not all, cookies
A father has baked cookies, takes them out of the oven, and puts them on the kitchen table. His daughter rushes in and goes straight for the cookies. The father has a rule R in mind that could be one of the following two: R = a : it is allowed to eat all cookies R = b : it is allowed to eat some, but not all cookies.
Before the father says anything the child does not know which of these two rules holds.
One ingredient of Bayesian modeling in cognitive science is that an agent's beliefs are modeled by probabilities. In the case of the cookies, the daughter's beliefs about each of the possible rules is captured by her prior probabilities P(R):
It is not implausible to assume that the child has some prior expectation about whether she will be allowed to eat all cookies or not. In the past she was Frank Jäkel and Mingya Liu allowed to eat a certain number of cookies in similar circumstances. These experiences are reflected in her beliefs π a and π b .
As the child goes for the cookies, the father will make an utterance N. If we consider only the quantifiers some and all, the child knows it can be one of three possible utterances: N = a : "you can have all" N = b : "you can have some, but not all" N = s : "you can have some".
The classical scalar implicature is that the father's utterance of "some" will be interpreted as some, but not all. The aim for the main part of this paper is to spell out in detail how this implicature can arise in a Bayesian inference framework. Briefly, the Bayesian analysis will recover the well-known explanation that he would have said "all" if he had meant all. Doing so will take several pages and at times the formal apparatus may seem a little clumsy when looked at through the eyes of a logician. Hence, one may question the utility of using probabilities for this problem in the first place. However, by recovering the basic logic of this explanation in probability theory we can then discuss more concretely the possible extensions in which the probabilistic framework may pay off. So bear with us.
Even before hearing the utterance, the child has some beliefs about what the father is likely to say in any given situation. Let us assume, plausibly, that the father only makes statements that are logically consistent with his rule and that the daughter understands this. Hence, if the father allows to eat all cookies (R = a) he will not say "you can have some, but not all" (N = b). He can still make two utterances
namely "you can have all" (N = a) and "you can have some" (N = s) and he will make the latter with a certain probability qâ. The child could learn this probability empirically as, from time to time, she is likely to receive explicit feedback. Similarly, if the father allows to eat some, but not all cookies (R = b), he can only make two utterances, namely "some" (N = s) and "some, but not all" (N = b). He will not say "all" (N = a) because this would be logically inconsistent with his rule. The child's beliefs about what the father will say in this case can be captured by one parameter qb,
In the following we will use qâ and qb as a shorthand for the child's beliefs that the father will utter "some" in the respective circumstances.
What should the child believe?
Another ingredient of Bayesian modeling in cognitive science is the assumption that agents behave (almost) rationally. Of course, this is not always the case, but a rational agent may serve as a good first approximation or as a first theoretical step for understanding real behavior. Hence, given the above scenario, what should a rational child believe after hearing one of the possible utterances? The laws of probability theory dictate that the daughter should update her beliefs about what the father might have meant by using Bayes' rule
i.e. she should compute the posterior probability that the father has a certain rule R in mind given his utterance N.
If the father utters "all" (N = a) or "some, but not all" (N = b), it is clear what he means, since these utterances can only be produced for one corresponding rule. Formally, the child's posterior belief in each rule given the utterance "all" is
because P(N = a | R = b) = 0 and similarly for the utterance "some, but not all"
More interestingly, if the father utters "some" (N = s), the daughter will be uncertain as to what the father might have meant. His utterance is ambiguous.
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It could mean some, but not all (R = b), but it could also mean all (R = a). The ambiguity that the child faces is captured by the following equations introducing the shorthand q̂for the daughter's posterior probability that the father meant some, but not all (R = b) when he said "some" (N = s).
The last equation can be used to model scalar implicatures. If q̂> 1 -2 she will believe more strongly that the father means some, but not all than she will believe he means some, and possibly all. Such a state of belief can be achieved for many settings of the prior (π a and π b ) and the likelihood (qâ and qb). For example, if the child knows that she is never allowed to eat all cookies then π a = 0. As it follows that q̂= 1, she will trivially interpret the utterance "some" as meaning some, but not all. Similarly, if the father never says "some" when he means all, the daughter will have picked up on this regularity and qâ = 0, also leading to q̂= 1.
This kind of underdetermination is not uncommon in Bayesian models of cognition. On the one hand, such underdetermination is realistic because there might, in fact, be different plausible explanations for a particular behavioral observation, such as the child not eating all the cookies. Without being able to look into an agent's head, it is hard to tell which one is the correct one and these different explanations are captured by different settings of the parameters of a model (here π a , π b , qâ, and qb). On the other hand, underdetermination is problematic because only one explanation can be the correct one in a given situation. Hence, in our example it is hard to tell why the child believes that "some" means some, but not all without additional information. One way to obtain such additional information is to constrain priors and likelihoods through additional empirical observations. For example, one could keep statistics on how often the child is actually allowed to eat all cookies and how often she hears "some" meaning all. If one had these statistics, one could further assume that the child's beliefs are veridical and substitute the child's beliefs for the empirical probabilities. In this way the free parameters of the model can be fixed and might provide a parameter-free explanation for the child's interpretation of "some" as some, but not all. However, these statistics are hard to come by.
Luckily, some additional insights can also be obtained through further theoretical considerations. In the following we will argue that irrespective of the prior probabilities (π a and π b ) and irrespective of how often the father actually takes "some" to mean all, the child should, in fact, believe that in the strategic situation under consideration, the father will never say "some" when he means all (qâ = 0). This in turn, by Eq. (5), leads to the desired scalar implicature that an adult speaker would make (q̂= 1). To spell out the full argument we first need to consider what a rational child should do after hearing her father's utterance.
What should the child do?
Actions not only depend on beliefs but also on the outcomes of these actions, that is their expected utilities (as already explained by F&J). Say the child can take the following two actions M = a : have all cookies M = b : have some, but not all cookies.
The utilities of taking M cookies when the father's rule was R are O P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P Q P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P R
It is better to eat all rather than only some cookies (u a > u b ) but this might come at a cost u c of violating the parent's rule (u a , u b , u c > 0). The child will get into trouble if she eats all the cookies but was not allowed to. The cost of this trouble is such that it is better to oblige (u b > u a − u c ). A rational child will choose the number of cookies that will maximize the expected utility. Hence, it is necessary to compute the expected utility for each action and check which one is the best given a certain utterance N. In equations, a rational child computes the expected utility for each possible action, M = a and M = b,
and chooses the action with the greater value. Therefore, if the father says "all", the expected utilities for the two actions are
since by Eq. (3) the child knows that the father allows to eat all cookies (R = a) and as u a > u b she will eat all cookies.
Similarly, if the father says "some, but not all"
since by Eq. (4) the child knows that she is not allowed to eat all cookies (R = b) and because u b > u a − u c the child will oblige and only eat some cookies, but not all. More interestingly, if the father utters the ambiguous word "some" (N = s), the expected utilities, by plugging in Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), will be
since if the action is to eat some, but not all cookies, the utility will not depend on what rule the father had in mind. Hence, the rational child will refrain from eating all cookies whenever u b > u a − u c q, or equivalently u c q̂> u a − u b . In words, if the difference in utility between eating all and some cookies is smaller than the expected loss that will be incurred if the parent's rule is violated, the child will resist the temptation of eating all cookies.
we can summarize what the rational child will do in response to the parent's utterances by three production rules:
2.3 What should the parent believe that the child will do?
Knowing his child, the father knows that his daughter is rational. The discussion will be simplified considerably by assuming that u a , u b , u c , and hence u are known perfectly to both, the child and the parent. The father's belief about what his daughter will do is captured by a probability distribution Q(M | N, R).
To differentiate the parent's beliefs from the child's beliefs, like F&J, we use a different symbol for the probabilities (Q rather than P). Note that even though we explicitly write that R is given in Q(M | N, R), since the parent knows R, the parent's belief about what the child will do does not actually depend on R because the child does not know R, hence Q(M | N, R) = Q(M | N). Note also that the father's reasoning can be hypothetical. He can reason about what the child will do in response to an utterance N before he has made that utterance. If the father utters "all", the situation will be straightforward. The rational father, who knows that his rational daughter has gone through the reasoning in the previous section, knows that his daughter will eat all cookies, i.e.
Similarly, when the father says "some, but not all", he knows his daughter well enough to know that she will oblige (after all, the cost u c for disobedience was chosen appropriately by him), i.e.
Again more interestingly, what will happen if the father utters the ambiguous word "some"? The following shorthand notation will be useful:
introducing p̂for the father's belief that the daughter will not eat all cookies (M = b) when he says she can have "some" (N = s). Remember that what the rational child will do depends completely on her belief q̂that the father's utterance of "some" means some, but not all. If the parent knows his child really well then he will know q. Therefore, he can predict her behavior. In general, however, his belief about the child's belief will be uncertain and is captured by his belief-function Q. Remembering that the child will eat all cookies in response to the utterance of "some" (N = s) if and only if q̂> u (see Eq. 7), the probability that the parent thinks that the child will eat all cookies is therefore more fully understood as
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What should the parent say?
Under which circumstances should the father say "some" when he means all? And when should a parent who does not want the child to eat all cookies say explicitly that the child can have "some, but not all"? Consider the former case first, i.e. R = a. Assume that in this case the parent has the following utility function
The father's utility function only depends on the daughter's actions, not on what he says. His happiness increases with the daughter's happiness. Or perhaps the father has aligned his goals with the daughter's goals and likes being helpful. Either way it will be better for him if the child eats all the cookies. The daughter's and the father's utility function for the case where it is allowed to eat all cookies are shown together on the left in Table 1 . The expected cost for the parent for each possible utterance is dependent on what he believes the child will do after hearing the utterance, i.e. on his beliefs Q(M | N, R) = Q(M | N). He will not say "some, but not all" (N = b) if he means all (R = a) because this would be logically inconsistent. But is it preferable to utter "some" (N = s) instead of "all" (N = a)? Using Eq. (8) and Eq. (10), the expected utilities for the these utterances are given by Table 1 : The daughter's and the father's utility function, u and v. The left part of the table shows the utilities for the case where it is allowed to eat all cookies. In this case it will be better for everyone if the child eats all cookies (u a > u b and v a > v b ). On the right it is not allowed to eat all cookies. Eating all cookies when it is not allowed comes at a cost that makes it unattractive for the child to do so (u b > u a − u c ). The parent also has some trouble when the child does not oblige (v c ) and has a small communication cost (v d < v c ) of saying the somewhat more cumbersome phrase "some, but not all" instead of "some". All parameters are greater than zero (u a , u b , u c , v a , v b , v c , v d > 0) . In those cases where the utterance N and the rule R are logically inconsistent (and therefore assumed to have zero probability), the utility function has a missing value in the table.
and therefore if the rational father allows to eat all cookies (R = a) then his utterance will always be "you can have all" (N = a) . If the father's rule is that it is allowed to eat some, but not all cookies (R = b) then he will not say "all" (N = a) because this would violate the assumption that he will not say something that is logically inconsistent. However, he is still free to say "some, but not all" or "some" and a reasonable utility function for these actions is O P P P P P P P P P P P Q P P P P P P P P P P P R
If the child violates the rule (M = a), there will be a cost v c for the trouble that this causes. Saying the more cumbersome phrase "some, but not all
For easy comparison, the daughter's and the father's utility function for the case where it is not allowed to eat all cookies are given on the right in Table 1 . The expected utilities for these utterances, using Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) are then
Hence, if the parent's rule is that it is not allowed to eat all cookies (R = b), then he will say "some" whenever v c (1 − p) < v d , or equivalently p̂> .
Introducing the
the following production rules summarize what the rational father will do:
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The last two sections showed that what the father will do depends completely on
i.e. his belief what the daughter's belief q̂is (Eq. 11). Recall that q̂is the daughter's belief about the father saying "some" when he means some, but not all. Also recall that the definition of the daughter's belief q̂(Eq. 5) was
and therefore depends on qâ and qb (that are defined in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2). If the daughter understands the reasoning in the previous section, because she has already developed a sufficiently good theory of mind, then she knows that
Hence, q̂depends on p̂which depends on q. We seem to have a deadlock: What the daughter believes the father will say depends on what the father believes the daughter will do which depends on what the daughter believes the father will say, and so on. This kind of scenario has written game theory all over it. Game theory was invented to deal with strategic situations where different agents have different interests and their best actions may depend on the other agents' unknown beliefs and actions.
Luckily, in our example the situation is very simple and the vicious circle can be broken. The rational daughter understands that the rational father will never say "some" when he means all, i.e. qâ = 0, because it is in his interest to make sure she eats all the cookies. This is the key step in the derivation. The daughter therefore knows that the father would have said "all" had he meant all. Plugging qâ = 0 into Bayes' rule (15) the daughter immediately also knows that
and the father in this particular strategic situation means some, but not all when he says "some". This is a scalar implicature. By applying Bayes' rule in this last step the daughter's belief q̂does not depend on the father's belief p̂ anymore. Interestingly, the prior probability π a of the father allowing the daughter to eat all cookies plays no role here either. As the father knows that the daughter knows this, he knows he can plug this result into Eq. (14) p̂=
As we have assumed throughout (Eq. 6) that eating all cookies if it is not allowed will be worse than just eating as many cookies as are allowed (
Therefore the father knows that the daughter will act accordingly and will not eat all cookies if he says that she can have "some". This completes our Bayesian rational analysis of scalar implicatures.
Discussion
The rational analysis presented here merely reconstructed one of the traditional explanations of scalar implicatures in a probabilistic framework. We presented this example because we think, compared to the examples given by F&J in their Section 6, it illustrates better how probabilistic models can handle interactivity in standard problems of formal pragmatics. When considering a new framework, recovering familiar explanations is a good first step and it is reassuring that it can be done. Accordingly, we think that F&J (p. 8) are right to emphasize that "probabilistic pragmatics is meant to complement, but not necessarily to compete with" other approaches. However, what are the added benefits of a probabilistic approach? We have demonstrated above that probabilistic models can be integrated with standard accounts of interactivity, but how could this analysis be extended fruitfully beyond traditional cases and traditional explanations? As probabilistic pragmatics is a new research program, it has a short track-record and most of its claims will be promissory. However, given our example, we can now give some concrete suggestions for interactive probabilistic models of scalar implicatures to illustrate potential benefits for using Bayesian modeling for pragmatics in general.
The most obvious benefit of a Bayesian approach, which is hardly worth reiterating given F&J's discussion, is that probabilities allow modelers to deal with uncertainty. In our example, this uncertainty is not only in the beliefs that the father and the daughter hold, but also in the observable behavior, i.e. their utterances and actions. Hence, the analysis presented above could be extended by the soft-max rule discussed by F&J. This will allow gradedness in subjects' judgments. But there are other promising routes that could be explored for Frank Jäkel and Mingya Liu studying scalar implicatures in a probabilistic framework that are not obvious from reading the target article.
For example, the theoretical debate on scalar implicatures has revolved around whether it is a pragmatic or a grammatical phenomenon (Grice 1975; Horn 1972; Geurts 2010; Chierchia, Fox, and Spector, 2012) and experimental studies address the processing aspect in favor of one or the other theory (Geurts and Pouscoulous 2009; Chemla and Spector 2011; Noveck 2011; van Tiel 2013) . The focus of most work is on how a scalar implicature arises and little work can be found on when and to what extent it arises. However, Degen (2015) reports on corpus-and experimental studies showing that implicatures related to the scale <some, all> are context-dependent and vary in strength. As our analysis explicitly incorporates the context-dependent utilities of the listener and the speaker, it becomes possible to extend the analysis to account for gradedness and context effects at the same time: Different strategic situations can be modeled by simply changing the utilities.
More concretely, if the father was not assumed to be helpful in the case where it is allowed to eat all cookies (i.e. his utilities are not aligned with the child's utilities), the strategic situation would be very different and resulting inferences as to what "some" means can be different, too. Hence, the Bayesian framework makes it possible to model pragmatic inferences that depend on the current beliefs and desires of agents in varying strategic situations. In a different strategic situation the usual scalar implicature may not be the right inference to make. To make this even more concrete, consider one of the defining properties for Gricean conversational implicatures, namely, their reforceability: If "some" always triggered the upper-bound implicature in a context-independent way, we would have to wonder why (potential) implicatures are reinforced (i.e. "some, but not all") in some contexts at all. While the question when and why a potential scalar implicature favors explicit mentioning is not well studied, our analysis above provides an ansatz: The father's choice between reinforcing a potential scalar implicature or not depends on whether p̂> v.
F&J (pp. 10-11) argue, we think convincingly, for the importance of "interactivity" in models of pragmatic phenomena. It is a consequence of interactivity that the context of the situation changes, often dramatically, with changes in the goals of the agents who are communicating (as the examples of indirect speech acts and scalar implicatures illustrate). By making utilities and costs for every agent explicit the strategic situation can be analyzed using tools from game theory, as it is pointed out in the target article. Furthermore, in competitive strategic situations where someone might want to conceal their goals or lying is a viable strategy, reasoning about another person's utility function is of great importance, and this is what the carpet example in the target article shows. F&J also make the relevance of reasoning about the other agent's strategic reasoning explicit in the carpet example. However, note that in their example there is no uncertainty about the prior assumptions of the other agent and in their target article F&J "refrain from a formal analysis" of this case (this volume: 35) . This is unfortunate because we believe that the possibility to explicitly model reasoning about reasoning under uncertainty is one of the most exciting aspects of Bayesian modeling for pragmatics. We agree with F&J that models should be "probabilistic" and "interactive" at the same time. While they emphasize "interactivity" throughout their article, they fail to give a truly interactive example that involves agents reasoning explicitly about each other's Bayesian reasoning in a mutually recursive fashion. Hence, with our example we try and fill this gap in their article: We give a linguistic example that combines reasoning under uncertainty with reasoning about the other agent's beliefs.
In our analysis, interpretation is modeled as 'reverse production' and production is modeled as 'reverse interpretation'. While the hearer needs to take into account speaker knowledge and contextual evidence of the speaker's intention to convey the upper-bound implicature (Degen 2015: 10) , additionally, the speaker needs to take into account hearer knowledge and contextual evidence of the hearer's intention to compute scalar implicatures. An important step towards understanding such Bayesian reasoning about Bayesian reasoning has been made in the Bayesian modeling language Church that allows so-called nested queries for that purpose (Goodman et al. 2008) . However, many computational and conceptual problems remain (see e.g., Blokpoel 2015; Madsen 2015) , especially when it comes to mutually recursive reasoning. Luckily, reasoning about reasoning has long been a topic for logicians, in particular in the context of multi-agent systems and epistemic logic, but the combination with reasoning under uncertainty using Bayesian beliefs is not very well understood yet in cognitive science. Take our example of scalar implicatures. Each subsection of Section 2 is formalized using standard decision theory and Bayesian inference. The actual reasoning about reasoning is, however, informal. In particular, it is therefore obscure how and when the vicious circle of mutually recursive reasoning can be broken. Future developments of probabilistic pragmatics will thus not only benefit from collaborations among linguists, game theorists, and Bayesian modelers, as made explicit in F&J's target article, but should also integrate the work of logicians on epistemic reasoning (Verbrugge 2009; Verbrugge and Mol 2008) .
Based on the observation that communication involves reasoning about other people's reasoning, Goodman and Stuhlmüller (2013) suggested that scalar implicatures (and similarly many other pragmatic phenomena) can be linked to models of social cognition that also involve Bayesian reasoning about Bayesian reasoning. In cognitive science there has recently been considerable progress on these models, especially in the context of theory of mind (Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum 2009; Baker and Tenenbaum 2014; Shafto, Goodman, and Frank 2012; Ullman et al. 2010) . Not all of this work has the mutually recursive, game-theoretic flavor of the above rational analysis, but in many situations it seems implausible that human agents actually engage in such "deeply recursive social reasoning" (Goodman and Stuhlmüller 2013: 183) . In any case, this exciting line of work has the potential to provide foundations for probabilistic pragmatics within the cognitive science of social reasoning.
Yet another, related and promising aspect of the above analysis is that one can also take a developmental perspective. Noveck (2001) reports that younger children behave in accordance with the logical interpretation of scalar items and they develop the ability to infer scalar implicatures only later. Our analysis highlights two factors that influence the development of children's understanding of scalar implicatures. First, children's logical understanding of quantifiers is presupposed (cf. the logical nativism of Crain 2008) . Second, understanding scalar implicatures depends on the development of a theory of mind. But what would happen if the child did not yet develop the necessary theory of mind to engage in reasoning about reasoning? In that case it is likely that the child's belief q̂about whether the father means some, but not all when he says "some" is purely driven by statistics and feedback that was obtained in the past without strategic considerations of the kind discussed above. As in other strategic situations "some" might in fact mean all and the child does not understand the strategic nature of the communication, the child might just keep track of how often each case happens and therefore acts inappropriately. In turn, a parent who observes that a child frequently understands "some" as compatible with all even in contexts where this is pragmatically inappropriate might get an estimate of p̂that is less than 1. If p̂is sufficiently small (p̂< v), the father will explicitly state that she can have "some, but not all" cookies. Such considerations seem relevant for explaining the developmental trajectory of children's understanding of scalar implicatures and follow naturally from the above rational analysis. Moreover, the same considerations might also help to explain inter-individual variability in children's pragmatic development.
Finally, our presentation focused on the probabilistic aspects of the derivation, but note that we have implicitly assumed a certain, very simple semantic theory. We used the standard logical interpretation that "some" can actually mean all. However, one can easily imagine how to extend the above approach to deal with cases involving more quantifiers (or other scalar items) and objects and actions that are not limited to cookies and eating. Furthermore, one could use a more sophisticated semantic formal apparatus that makes it possible to deal with generalized quantifiers. Piantadosi (2011: Ch. 3), for example, has studied how semantic representations for quantifiers could be learned by children, also using a Bayesian approach, and the same formal apparatus could be used similarly here. In this way, contrary to F&J's examples in their Section 6, our example makes contact with standard theories in semantics.
In general, one of the most tantalizing aspects of probabilistic pragmatics is that it can be integrated within Bayesian cognitive science, which F&J fail to mention explicitly. As pragmatics interacts with semantics, reasoning, social reasoning, and in children also language acquisition and cognitive development, it seems promising to try and integrate all of these aspects in one framework. Probabilistic modeling might be able to provide the glue that is necessary to integrate ideas from different subfields of cognitive science. While Bayesian cognitive science is far from providing such a framework, the current excitement -that is also tangible in the article by F&J -stems from the prospect that it might in the future.
